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"Our season of drought is reminder rude:—  
No later than yesternoon,  
I looked on the horse of a cart,  
By the wayside water trough.  
How at every draught of his bride of thirst  
His nostrils widened! The sight was good:  
Food for us, food, such as first  
Drew our thoughts to earth's lowly for food."

M. STURGE HENDERSON.

KINGHAM, OXON., ENGLAND.

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### MATTHEW ARNOLD ON THE "POWERS" OF LIFE.

If we wish to know what interests ethical philosophers most, I suppose we can find a clue in the badges and party-names they wear. Hedonism, "teleological energism," "ethical idealism," these, which are taken as marking parties, are the names of opinions about what is the largest good conceivable, or about the nature of good. Determinism, indeterminism—these are names of opinions about the sense in which we are free to pursue or reject the good at all. If we examine the contents of contemporary volumes on ethics, the emphasis of such names will not surprise us. The questions whether "ought" can be reduced to "is," whether "ought" is super-personal, how the "ought" of logic and æsthetics is related to that of ethics; again, "pleasure, duty and the good"—especially pleasure, eternal focus for the refining intellects of psychology, metaphysics and the theory of knowledge—take up a generous space in the books and, as we soon perceive, in the moralists' minds. Now the factitious problem of "free will," though it is admirably calculated to sharpen the analytic instrument of the human mind, and to afford a field for those temperamental impulses that play so great a part in philosophy, has for morals probably no importance whatever. And though this is not quite true of the nature of obligation and the good, yet it is almost true. As a student of these things I was not wholly taken aback when a well-kown English philosopher dropped the remark, "Of course ethics has nothing to say about what we are to do."

Those who take interest in what we are to do would do well to look mainly, for the present, elsewhere. Let them turn for instance from Mill's Utilitarianism to his essay on Bentham. "We are much nearer" Mill says, "agreeing with Bentham in his principle than in the degree of importance which he attached to it. We think utility, or happiness, much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought except through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning which there may be, and often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate standard. As mankind are much more nearly of one nature than of one opinion about their own nature, they are more easily brought to agree in their intermediate principles, *vera illa et media axiomata*, as Bacon says, than in their first principles."

It is worth while to recall attention to an idea of one of the most judicious English philosophers of the nineteenth century, a philosopher not of first principles—for he feels that in respect of settlement at least, the first shall be last—but of *axiomata media*, of middle principles. Matthew Arnold tells us that broadly speaking, human completeness requires the development of four powers. Granting at the outset vitality and progressiveness, granting, that is, what he calls expansion—there are required the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social life and manners, and the power of beauty. The Hebrew nation was pre-eminent in morals. The Hellenic race was pre-eminent in the other three powers. In modern times, Italy excels in the sense for beauty, Germany in intellect and knowledge, France in the instinct for social life and manners. But "when we talk of man's advance toward his full humanity, we think of an advance, not along one line only, but along several"—along all these four.

It has been said that Arnold was no analyst. He was, I think, a born analyst of a peculiar sort. He never pushed his analysis to the atom, never to the bitter or insipid end, never where science alone could follow him, never beyond what the naked eye could see. The philosopher of middle principles, the seer of the naked eye, he does here the admirable service that he is fitted to do. He gives us the sublimation of a rule of

thumb, a distinction that can be verified without apparatus, a rough but available classification. In the study of men, societies, sentiments and philosophies it forwards us. Here I wish only to ask, in Arnold's own spirit (that is, without attempting an irrelevant psychological nicety of analysis), What does it involve? and Is it complete?

It involves, in one power, more than Arnold or his northern race have clearly felt. It involves the independence of the power of beauty. Northern philosophy has usually made beauty exist for the sake of something else. It is a training for something else, or a secret vision of something else, it is almost always something else in disguise. In his scheme, as we see, Arnold gives a place to beauty in fee simple, but when in his essay on Wordsworth he comes to tell us the function of poetry, he says it is to criticise life, that is, if I understand him, to show us the things of life in such lights that we see their true values. To give us insight into the values that pertain to life; that is a moral function. Poetry can do this, but it can do something else. Poetry for beauty he disparages. And when he comes to his essay on poetry he ascribes the same function to all literature. But the experience of beauty is a form of well-being, of the good, however that may be defined. It is an end in itself, though it can harmonize with other ends.

And now, are there any omissions? We may ask where to put the practical wisdom or shrewdness of daily life; but probably this, so far as it can be taught or consciously developed, can be accommodated in the department of intellect and knowledge. There is, however, a power for which it is not easy to find a place under any of the four. I mean the human affections. For by the power of social intercourse and manners Arnold means tact and grace, urbanity and amenity, not the elemental passions of society. He means the trait which is his favorite, though he would not put it first, that *ἐπιεικεία*, that reasonableness with sweetness to which he so often recurs. Thus in the four powers we have conscience, taste, and mind represented—taste both in beauty and in social life—but heart not fully. In the essay on Wordsworth he regards it as the merit of Wordsworth's poetry to make us feel

the value, the happiness, that lies in the affections as well as in the care for nature; but in general it may be said that the affections did not sufficiently figure in his scheme, did not sufficiently color, for instance, his idea of God. Accordingly they find no sufficient place in his plan of human completeness.

And then, religion. Arnold places it of course with conduct; since religion is, to him, "morality touched with emotion"—the moral sense heightened and aglow with the emotions proper to it—with the feeling, that is, of its obedience and affinity to the power in the world that makes for righteousness. One does not like to tamper casually with anything reasoned in so large and sane a spirit as Arnold's account of these things. But it may be said, with some diffidence, that there appears an element in religion that sometimes takes forms independent of the feeling of conscience supported by an exterior power. The creature, as we have all learned to say, lives by "reacting upon" his environment. When he is on all fours he sees little but the environment to which he must immediately respond. But, to speak both literally and in a metaphor, when he stands erect he can more readily look before and after. He can see, or the developing hemispheres of the brain enable him to imagine, stretches of environment destined, it may be, to affect him in the future, filled to his imagination with vague portent, but to which he does not know how to make present response. This leaves him in some degree of that disturbing uncertainty that seizes us when we feel environing forces but do not know what "reaction" to make. The imagination must solve the problem it has created. It must enable him to represent the potentialities of which for the first time he has become aware, in such a form that he can at once react appropriately to them and not be left wholly at a loss. If we never had time to think, religion would not arise. If we never had time to look about us, to grow conscious of our weakness in the presence of complex circumstance and doubtful futures, we should never want to know the character, the *spirit* of those forces and futures, that we might propitiate or trust or rejoice in them. Religion seems not primarily a need of the conscience, but a spiritual need—a need of our own literal spirit, which must have support

in its hours of liberated consciousness. It seems one of the forms of the demand for knowledge, that we may adjust ourselves to our life. No doubt the spirit of things, once represented, may address itself to our conscience and conscience may fitly lean upon it. But even in the highest religion there appears something beyond the moral, though partly fused with that—a reverent companionship with the spirit of the world.

Arnold seems thus to have omitted from his inventory the power of the affections and the distinctive power of religion. He has made another, a more unrelieved omission. It is the grand omission characteristic of his class; of men of intellect and men of soul, who feel the spell of their studies and live in the brain. It is also the grand omission characteristic of mature age. It is an omission that tends to be characteristic of civilization, on which Arnold's eye is fixed. He leaves out the power of bodily life and the senses. It never occurs to him to include that power. That power is only an instrument, a means of making the other powers possible. In "Culture and Anarchy" we find him quoting the Epistle to Timothy, the common sense of Franklin, and the pagan philosophy of Epictetus to the same effect, that bodily exercise and pleasure have no other value than to keep us in health. "The moment we disjoin them," he says, "from the idea of a perfect spiritual condition and pursue them for their own sake . . . our worship of them becomes mere worship of machinery." Yet this is all a relic of the ascetic contempt for the flesh, the perverted doctrine of purification. The refinement of the senses does not consist solely in their repression or in their subordination to the mind. They have their own law of refinement. The delight in the body's force and the senses' freshness, physical *Lebensherrlichkeit*, is a form of well-being, of the good, however that may be defined. It is an end-in-itself, though it can harmonize with other ends.

We seem now to have reviewed all the large powers that go to the making of human faculty in its civilized completeness. Let us enumerate them. The power of conduct, the power of bodily life and the senses, the power of the affections, the power of religion, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social life and manners, the power of beauty. We have here

at once an aid toward placing the partial ideals of authors and spiritual movements, and toward combining the fragments they offer in a whole. Let me take but a single instance. We could ill spare Carlyle from moral literature, but in all these powers but one he is found wanting. His prodigious gift for painting life and imparting impulse cannot hide the poverty of his ideal world; the fact that it is the power of conduct, some portion of the powers of religion, beauty, and affection, and these only, that his work sufficiently acknowledges. The deficiency once seen, he will not let us forget it; he not only fails to acknowledge the rest, he is too ready to disparage them. But it is not enough to find in any teacher how far these powers are represented or discerned. To find the order of their precedence in the author's interest or ideal, and in the light of life and many ideals to find the just order of their precedence, these are some of the tasks for which we have here a rough but ready and trusty material supplied. I have detailed them in the order of what seems their social importance.

This brings me to a remark on the construction of the scheme. Rightly looked upon, the power of conduct includes all. Ethics really has to answer the question, How to live. What we call morals (and this name might best be substituted for that of the first power)—morals or the more elementary power of conscience, has taken to itself the title that belongs in strictness to the whole, because it was the first thing needful. It was better to smite that string even if the rest were left silent. But in a large view the idea of right compasses the whole life; nothing escapes it. For in the end the right identifies itself with the best. Arnold himself feels this is the conclusion of "Literature and Dogma," where he tells us that eventually the divine will appear as the power that makes, not only for righteousness, but for the fulfillment of the whole law of our being, and to which not only a sin against conscience, but a sin against good taste is an offence.

Such a way of considering life is simple; and not therefore shallow or unsound. Indeed, I cannot lay the subject down without a return of admiration for Arnold's desire to point out what all may see, to see, for his own part, eye to

eye with his fellow-minds. "This," he says, "is the *social idea*. The men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have labored to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanize it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time." The abstract, the difficult, let us add, science must enter upon; but to labor as we can to divest knowledge of its difficulty, to make it a simpler and thereby a clearer knowledge, is an effort conceived in the spirit of science itself.

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## A METHOD OF DEALING WITH THE LABOR PROBLEM.

The old way of dealing with distress arising out of imperfect social conditions was by the indiscriminate and unorganized distribution of doles, a method perhaps justified in certain social stages. Of new ways, originating from new conditions of life and largely from a more sensitive conscience, there seems to be so many that it is difficult even to enumerate them. The latest development, and it is a very surprising one, is chiefly inspired by commercial considerations and aims to do the utmost for the employé because, so the theory runs, the more the welfare of the worker is studied, the more will the establishment in which he is employed thrive. However, the widely recognized methods of dealing with the social problem are of various kinds and are due to various motives. There is the method of organized charity, as illustrated by the London Charity Organization Society, the *Auskunftsstelle* of the Berlin Ethical Society, and the Paris *Société des Visiteurs*, all aiming not so much to alleviate as to remove distress and all anxious to develop rather than to lower self-respect, as can be seen even in the more or less intentionally ambiguous names of those bodies. A relatively higher and different kind of philanthropy is that of the "good" employer